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I. INTRODUCTION 
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Chevron Pipe Line Company and 
Northwest Terminalling Company ("Chevron") for two independent reasons. Acting well within its 
discretion, the district court held that Robby and Kim Mowrey (the "Mowreys") should be judicially 
estopped from proceeding with this lawsuit because they failed to disclose their claim against 
Chevron in bankruptcy despite knowing about the facts giving rise to the lawsuit at the time they 
filed and during the many years that followed. In the alternative, the district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Chevron because the Mowreys were not the real party in interest to pursue their 
claim for damages. Both of these rulings were correct and should be affirmed. 
Seeking to overturn the district court's decision, the Mowreys ignore this Court's 
formulation of the judicial estoppel doctrine and instead rely on sound bites from various state and 
federal courts around the country. By citing these decisions, the Mowreys attempt to interject 
additional elements in Idaho's common law application of judicial estoppel that this Court has 
never recognized or required and, in fact, has rejected. The Mowreys suggest, for example, that 
Chevron had a burden to show intent to conceal, prejudice to the parties, and that the debt 
discharged in bankruptcy court had a nexus or privity with the current claim against Chevron. 
However, this Court has never required a showing of intent to conceal. It has also specifically 
rejected prejudice and privity as prerequisites to application of judicial estoppel. 
In a one-paragraph argument that includes no citation to cases or statutes, the Mowreys 
also note their disagreement with the district court's reasoned decision that they are not the real 
party in interest to proceed with this lawsuit. The Mowreys have not, however, appropriately 
raised this issue because they have not cited any cases or statutes in support. Even if the Mowreys 
had properly raised the issue, they have not articulated any reason for reversal of the district 
court's decision. It is undisputed that the Mowreys failed to disclose this lawsuit in bankruptcy 
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and the trustee has not adjudicated or abandoned the claim to the Mowreys. It is likewise 
undisputed that the trustee never moved to participate as a party, despite having knowledge of the 
issue and an ample opportunity to do so. The district court correctly granted summary judgment 
in Chevron's favor as a result. 
The Mowreys have not explained how the district court's application of judicial estoppel 
was an abuse of discretion or adequately raised the issue regarding real party in interest. The 
Mowreys thus make no legitimate argument on appeal; the district court should be affirmed, and 
Chevron is entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees because the Mowreys' appeal is frivolous 
and without foundation. 
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
The Mowreys' allegations of personal injury are irrelevant to the issue whether the district 
court acted within its discretion by applying the doctrine of judicial estoppel to the facts of this 
case and holding that the Mowreys are not the real party in interest to maintain their claim. 
The nature of this appeal centers on the integrity of the judicial system and on the obligations of 
debtors in bankruptcy to make complete disclosure of all their assets. 
B. STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS. 
1. Robby Mowrey Was Injured on June 29, 2005. 
According to the Mowreys' complaint, Robby Mowrey was injured on June 29, 2005 at a 
petroleum loading facility owned or operated by Chevron. R. Vol. I, pp. 3-4, iii! 9-11. Mowrey 
alleges that he suffered "substantial and permanent injury" in the accident and was incapacitated 
as a result. Id., iii! 11-13. 
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2. The Mowreys Filed Bankruptcy and Swore to the Bankruptcy Court That 
They had $0.00 in Contingent and Unliquidated Claims. 
On September 8, 2005, approximately three months after the accident, the Mowreys filed 
a Voluntary Petition for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the 
District ofldaho, Case No. 05-42048-JDP (hereinafter the "bankruptcy petition"). R. Vol. I, 
pp. 33-74. According to the bankruptcy petition, the Mowreys were "not represented" by counsel. 
R. Vol. I, p. 33. 
The bankruptcy petition included "Schedule B - Personal Property" (hereinafter 
"Schedule B"). R. Vol. I, pp. 54-58. Schedule B, which purported to list all of the Mowreys' 
personal property, included a section for the Mowreys to disclose "Other contingent and 
unliquidated claims of every nature, including tax refunds, counterclaims of the debtor, and rights 
to setoff claims." R. Vol. I, p. 57, if 20. The Mowreys did not disclose any claim against 
Chevron on Schedule B and, instead, listed $0.00 in contingent and unliquidated claims. Id. 
The bankruptcy petition also included the Plaintiffs' "Unsworn Declaration under Penalty 
of Perjury" whereby the Plaintiffs declared "under penalty of perjury that we have read the 
foregoing schedules, A through J, and that they are true and correct to the best of our knowledge, 
information, and belief." R. Vol. I, p. 49. The Mowreys concede submitting the schedule to the 
bankruptcy court. App. Br. at 2. 
3. The Bankruptcy Court Discharged Approximately $15,000 in Debt Based 
On the Mowreys' Inaccurate Schedules. 
The Mowreys' bankruptcy petition also included "Schedule F - Creditors Having 
Unsecured Nonpriority Claims" (hereinafter "Schedule F"). In Schedule F, the Mowreys 
disclosed approximately $15,000 of debt owed to unsecured nonpriority creditors. R. Vol. I, p. 65. 
On or about December 18, 2005, based on their representations made to the bankruptcy court in 
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the bankruptcy petition and schedules, the Mowreys obtained a discharge of their debts pursuant 
to Section 727, Title 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. R. Vol. I, p. 75. 
4. The Mowreys Knew of Their Potential Claim Against Chevron But Did Not 
Amend Their Bankruptcy Schedules. 
On or about June 5, 2006, after the Mowreys received a discharge of their debts, the trustee 
moved the bankruptcy court to reopen the Mowreys' bankruptcy on grounds that the trustee 
discovered that the Mowreys were entitled to a 2005 tax refund that should have been part of the 
bankruptcy estate. R. Vol. I, p. 78. At the same time and by their own admission, "[d]uring, or 
immediately prior to, July 2006, the Plaintiffs were advised by the claims representative for the 
Idaho State Insurance Fund to consult with an attorney regarding the worker's compensation claim 
of Plaintiff Robby Mowrey." R. Vol. I, pp. 105-06, if 6. Shortly thereafter, the Mowreys retained 
an attorney who specifically told them they had a potential claim against Chevron. R. Vol. I, 
p. 106, if 6, p. 122, if 6 ("In July, 2006, debtors retained an attorney ... and at that time discovered 
for the first time that they had a potential third party claim as a result of the accident."); see also 
R. Vol. I, pp. 96-97, 100. 
Throughout 2006, despite the fact that the bankruptcy had been reopened and knowing that 
they had a potential claim against Chevron, the Mowreys did not alert the bankruptcy court or the 
bankruptcy trustee to the worker's compensation claim or to the potential claim they had against 
Chevron. Instead, the Mowreys filed a single amendment to their bankruptcy petition in an attempt 
to keep the 2005 tax return for themselves. See R. Vol. 1, p. 80. Specifically, they filed an 
"Amended Schedule C - Property Claimed as Exempt," but the Mowreys did not file an "Amended 
Schedule B - Personal Property" to disclose the worker's compensation claim or the claim against 
Chevron. 
On May 4, 2007, again relying on the representations made by the Mowreys, the 
bankruptcy court entered an Order Approving Trustee's Supplemental Final Report, Discharging 
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Trustee, and Closing the Estate. R. Vol. 1, p. 81. Because of the representations made by the 
Mowreys under the penalty of perjury in the bankruptcy court, they received the advantage of a 
discharge of their debt. They also received the benefit of the automatic stay, which prevented 
any creditors from maintaining actions against them during pendency of the bankruptcy. See 
11 U.S.C. § 362. 
5. The Mowreys Then Sued Chevron But Still Did Not Alert the Bankruptcy 
Court to the Claim. 
On June 19, 2007, only six weeks after the bankruptcy court closed the Mowreys' 
reopened bankruptcy, the Mowreys filed the complaint against Chevron in this matter. See 
R. Vol. I, pp. 1-6. The Mowreys later filed an amended complaint on June 19, 2007. Id, pp. 7-13. 
Trial was initially set for February 3, 2009, but the Mowreys moved to continue the trial, first in 
December 2008, then in August 2009, May 2010, September 2010, and again in December 2010. 
From the date of the bankruptcy petition (September 8, 2005) to the date Chevron filed 
their motion for summary judgment (January 18, 2011 )-a period of over five years-the 
Mowreys did not once move to reopen their bankruptcy case or amend their schedules to list 
their claim against Chevron. 
6. The Mowreys Belatedly Moved to Reopen Their Bankruptcy Case. 
In January 2011, in direct response to Chevron's motion for summary judgment, the 
Mowreys moved to reopen their bankruptcy case and, for the first time, sought leave to amend 
their inaccurate schedules to list the claim against Chevron. R. Vol. I, pp. 121-23. Thereafter, 
on January 28, 2011, the bankruptcy court entered an order again reopening the Mowreys' 
bankruptcy case. R. Vol. I, p. 129. The bankruptcy court also entered an order authorizing the 
Mowreys' counsel, Brent Morgan, to represent the Mowreys and the trustee in this lawsuit. 
R. Vol. I, p. 157. That order went no further because the trustee never moved to substitute 
himself or to abandon the claim to the Mowreys. 
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C. THE DISTRICT COURT GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON THE MOWREYS' 
KNOWING FAILURE TO DISCLOSE THEIR CLAIM AGAINST CHEVRON AND THE TRUSTEE'S 
FAILURE TO JOIN THE LAWSUIT. 
On July 12, 2011, the district court entered summary judgment in Chevron's favor and 
dismissed this lawsuit with prejudice. R. Vol. I, pp. 139-52. The district court's first reason for 
decision was that "[t]he elements of judicial estoppel have been met in this case." See R. Vol. I, 
p. 147. The district court found that: (1) the Mowreys obtained an advantage through a discharge 
of their debt in the bankruptcy court; (2) the advantage was obtained through a declaration made 
under the penalty of perjury to the bankruptcy court; and (3) the Mowreys adopted a position 
inconsistent with their declaration in this case against Chevron. R. Vol. I, p. 149. 
The district court acknowledged that "judicial estoppel is inappropriate in cases of conduct 
amounting to nothing more than mistake or inadvertence." R. Vol. I, p. 146. However, the district 
court also went on to cite this Court's established precedent that "the knowledge that the party 
possesses, or should have possessed, at the time the statement is made is determinative as to 
whether that person is 'playing fast and loose' with the court." R. Vol. I, p. 146 (citing McKay v. 
Owens, 130 Idaho 148, 155, 937 P.2d 1222, 1229 (1997)). 
The district court found that the Mowreys "had knowledge of more than enough facts to 
determine that they had a potential cause of action" while their bankruptcy case was pending, but 
never modified their petition or schedules. R. Vol. I, p. 148. The district court based this finding 
in part on the allegations made in the amended complaint in this case. See, e.g., R. Vol. I, p. 148 
("For example, the Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint alleged that Mr. Mowrey 'suffered substantial 
and permanent impairment and/or disability' caused by the failure of the Chevron's equipment on 
June 29, 2005.") (citing Amended Complaint,~ 15). The district court stated further that · 
"[ e ]vidence that the Plaintiff had sufficient knowledge of facts enough to realize they had a 
potential cause of action against the Chevron is also found by the timing of the filing of the cause 
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of action in this matter on June 19, 2007, only six weeks after their bankruptcy estate closed." 
R. Vol. I, p. 149. 
In the alternative, the district court concluded that the Mowreys "lack standing to bring 
their claims against Chevron because the Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee, and not the Plaintiffs, is 
the real party in interest in the cause of action against the Defendants." R. Vol. I, p. 151. The 
district court entered summary judgment on this alternative basis. 
The Mowreys moved for reconsideration of the summary judgment decision, and the 
district court denied the motion in a subsequent written decision. See R. Vol. II, pp. 222-4 3. 
III. ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Should this Court award Chevron its reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred 
in responding to this appeal because the appeal was brought and pursued frivolously and without 
foundation? 
IV. ARGUMENT 
The district court acted within its discretion and correctly applied the doctrine of judicial 
estoppel in granting Chevron's motion for summary judgment and in dismissing the Mowreys' 
claim against Chevron. The Mowreys' arguments on appeal are premised on factors and 
considerations that are not controlling and have not been adopted in Idaho. 
In the alternative, the district court's decision should be affirmed because the district court 
properly held that the Mowreys are not the real party in interest to pursue the claim and the trustee 
failed to answer or appear, despite having had a reasonable opportunity to do so. For these 
reasons, the district court should be affirmed. 
Chevron should recover its reasonable attorneys' fees incurred in responding to this appeal 
because the Mowreys have not articulated how the district court abused its discretion by applying 
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judicial estoppel or adequately raised an argument regarding real party in interest. The appeal has 
thus been brought and pursued frivolously and fees are appropriate under Idaho Code§ 12-121. 
A. THIS COURT REVIEWS THE DISTRICT COURT'S APPLICATION OF JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL 
FOR AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
The Mowreys rightly concede that "[j]udicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine, invoked at 
the discretion of the court." App. Br. at 15 (citing Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242, 252, 92 P.3d 
492, 502 (2004)). Therefore, the Court should "not overturn a district court's discretionary 
application of the judicial estoppel doctrine 'unless it plainly appears that the court committed a 
clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon weighing of the proper factors."' Id. 
See also Riley v. W.R. Holdings, LLC, 143 Idaho 116, 121-22, 138 P.3d 316, 321-22 (2006). 
There are a number of reasons that a district court's application of judicial estoppel is 
reviewed for an abuse of discretion as opposed to de nova. See Stallings v. Bussmann Corp., 447 
F .3d 1041, 1046 (8th Cir. 2006). For example, "deferential review often is appropriate for matters 
in which the trial court is 'better positioned ... to decide the issue in question."' Id. (citations 
omitted). "And the district court is in a better position to decide if judicial estoppel applies 
because ' [ d]etermining whether a litigant is playing fast and loose with the courts has a subjective 
element [and] [i]ts resolution draws upon the trier's intimate knowledge of the case at bar and his 
or her first hand observations of the lawyers and their litigation strategies.'" Id. (quoting 
Alternative Sys. Concepts, Inc. v. Synopsys, Inc., 374 F.3d 23, 30-31 (1st Cir. 2004)). Further, 
"because judicial estoppel has an 'amorphous nature' and requires flexibility, the flexible abuse of 
discretion standard should apply." Id. Finally, most, if not all courts to have addressed this 
question have settled unanimously on abuse of discretion. Id. 
"A trial court does not abuse its discretion if it ( 1) correctly perceives the issue as 
discretionary, (2) acts within the bounds of discretion and applies the correct legal standards, and 
(3) reaches the decision through an exercise ofreason." Gerdon v. Rydalch, 153 Idaho 237, 280 
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P.3d 740 (2012). In this case, there is no dispute that the district court correctly perceived the 
issue as discretionary. See R. Vol. I, pp. 146-4 7 (recognizing that application of judicial estoppel 
is subject to the district court's discretion). As discussed below, the district court correctly 
identified and applied the appropriate legal standards and reached its decision through an exercise 
of reason. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT ACTED WITHIN ITS DISCRETION BY APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF 
JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL BECAUSE THE MOWREYS MADE INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS, 
RECEIVED AN ADVANTAGE, AND KNEW THE FACTS UPON WHICH THE CLAIM IS BASED. 
InA&J Construction Co., Inc. v. Wood, 141 Idaho 682, 116 P.3d 12 (2005) this Court cited 
to the United States Supreme Court's decision in New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750 
(2001 ), which recited "three factors courts may consider when determining whether to apply the 
doctrine of judicial estoppel." These factors include the following: 
First, courts may look at whether a party's later position is "clearly 
inconsistent" with its prior position. . . . Secondly, courts may look 
at whether the party succeeded in persuading the court to accept its 
prior position, so that acceptance of the later position would create 
"the perception that either the first or the second court was misled." 
Finally, courts may consider whether the party asserting the 
inconsistent position "would derive an unfair advantage or impose 
an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped." 
A&J Constr. Co, Inc., 141 Idaho at 687, 116 P3d at 17. 
The doctrine of judicial estoppel exists to prohibit a "party from assuming a position in one 
proceeding and then taking an inconsistent position in a subsequent proceeding." Riley, 143 Idaho 
at 121-22, 138 P.3d at 321-22. The doctrine "is intended to prevent a litigant from playing fast 
and loose with the courts." Heinze v. Bauer, 145 Idaho 232, 235, 178 P.3d 597, 600 (2008). 
While judicial estoppel is inappropriate in cases of conduct amounting to nothing more than 
mistake or inadvertence, "the knowledge that the party possesses, or should have possessed, at the 
time the statement is made is determinative as to whether that person is 'playing fast and loose' 
with the court." Id, 145 Idaho at 236, 178 P.3d at 601 (emphasis added). "Stated another way, 
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the concept of judicial estoppel takes into account not only what a party states under oath in open 
court, but also what that party knew, or should have known, at the time the original position was 
adopted." Id, 145 Idaho at 235-36, 178 P.3d at 600-01 (quoting McKay, 130 Idaho at 155, 937 
P.2d at 1229). 
The district court acted within its discretion when it held that (1) the Mowreys made a 
sworn statement that is "clearly inconsistent" with their current position; (2) the Mowreys 
persuaded the bankruptcy court to apply their former position by granting them stay and 
discharge; and (3) the Mowreys obtained an advantage through the inconsistent statements. 
The undisputed facts support the district court's findings on each of these elements. Furthermore, 
the record supports the district court's finding that the Mowreys knew the facts upon which their 
claim against Chevron is based at the time they made the inconsistent sworn statements. 
1. By Bringing This Lawsuit, the Mowreys Have Taken an Inconsistent Position. 
The district court correctly recognized the Mowreys' inconsistent statement in its order 
granting summary judgment. R. Vol. I, pp. 141-4 7. The Mowreys do not dispute, and thus 
concede, that they took an inconsistent position by declaring that they had "$0.00" in contingent 
and unliquidated claims while maintaining a lawsuit against Chevron seeking to recover hundreds 
of thousands of dollars. Thus, the district court correctly applied the relevant legal standards to the 
first New Hampshire factor and found that it had been satisfied. See A&J Const. Co., Inc., 141 
Idaho at687, 116 P.3d at 17 (citing New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 750). 
2. The Mowreys Concede That the Bankruptcy Court Relied on Their Sworn 
Statements. 
The district court found that the bankruptcy court and trustee relied on the Mowreys' 
sworn statement that they had "$0.00" in contingent and unliquidated claims and that they 
received a discharge in bankruptcy based on those claims. Id The Mowreys do not dispute this 
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finding on appeal and thus concede this factor too. Once again, the district court correctly 
identified and applied the applicable legal standard. Id. 
3. The Mowreys Received the Advantage of the Automatic Stay and the 
Advantage of a Discharge of Their Debt. 
The district court also found that the Mowreys obtained an advantage through their sworn 
statements before the district court. R. Vol. I, p. 149. The Mowreys seek to overturn this finding 
on appeal, arguing that they did not avail themselves of any "advantage" by omitting their claim 
against Chevron. App. Br. at 18-19. But this Court has specifically held that application of the 
automatic stay and a discharge of debt is an "advantage" sufficient to satisfy the benefit element of 
judicial estoppel. A&J Constr. Co., Inc., 141 Idaho at 687, 116 P .3d at 17 (citing Hamilton v. State 
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 270 F.3d 778, 785 (9th Cir. 2001)). Given this express holding by this Court 
in A&J Construction Co., Inc., the Mowreys cannot dispute that they received a benefit by obtaining 
discharge in bankruptcy based on their inaccurate and incomplete disclosures. 
4. The Mowreys Cannot Argue Inadvertence Because They Knew Facts Giving 
Rise to the Lawsuit When Filing Bankruptcy. 
Seeking to distract the Court from the undisputed facts of this matter, the Mowreys 
contend that "[t]he district court abused its discretion, as there was no evidence in the record 
that the Mowreys' conduct was anything other than a good faith omission or an inadvertent 
oversight." App. Br. at 16. This is a plain misstatement of the record and the law. The Court 
made specific findings as to the knowledge the Mowreys had at the time they filed for bankruptcy, 
and that knowledge is determinative as to whether the Mowreys were "playing fast and loose" 
with the court. Heinze, 145 Idaho at 235-36, 178 P.3d at 600-01. Moreover, even if the record 
regarding knowledge were not so clear, the district court would have had the discretion to apply 
the doctrine of judicial estoppel to the record before it. See, e.g., Riley, 143 Idaho at 121-22, 138 
P.3d at 321-22 (abuse of discretion standard applies). 
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The district court concluded that even before the Mowreys filed their bankruptcy petition 
they "had knowledge of more than enough facts to determine that they had a potential cause of 
action against the Defendants." R. Vol. I, p. 148. The district court based its decision on 
representations made by the Mowreys in their amended complaint in this case. The district court 
noted the following averments made by the Mowreys in their pleadings: 
• "Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint alleged that Mr. Mowrey 'suffered substantial 
and permanent impairment and/or disability' caused by the failure of the 
Defendants' equipment on June 29, 2005." R. Vol. I, p. 148 (citing Amended 
Complaint, iI 15). 
• "Plaintiffs stated Mr. Mowrey was injured when he was moving a swing arm at 
the Defendants' facility." R. Vol. I, p. 148. 
• "[T]he swing arm collapsed onto the body of the Plaintiff, striking the Plaintiff in 
the hip and knocking him to the ground, where the Plaintiff landed sharply and 
very hard on his leg, hip, and back, sustaining serious injuries ... " R. Vol. I, 
p. 148 (citing Amended Complaint, iI 14). 
• "These injuries have severely and adversely affected [Mr. Mowrey's] health, 
strength and physical and mental condition; said Plaintiff has had to undergo 
substantial medical treatment as a result of said injuries to include, but not limited 
to, cervical, dorsal and lumbosacral strain and sprain, injury to his right leg and 
calf; injury to his hip; disc herniation and/or protusion at L4-5, L5-S 1 and C3-4; 
and, in various other ways suffered serious and severe bodily injuries." R. Vol. I, 
p. 148 (citing Amended Complaint, iI 15). 
Thus, the district court appropriately concluded that "[b]y the very wording of the 
Complaint, the Plaintiffs had knowledge that Mr. Mowrey had suffered 'serious and severe bodily 
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injuries' as a result of the Defendants' swing arm 'collaps[ing] onto' him on June 25, 2005." 
R. Vol. I, pp. 148-49. The district court further supported its conclusion stating that "[e]vidence 
that the Plaintiff had sufficient knowledge of facts enough to realize they had a potential cause of 
action against the Defendants is also found by the timing of the filing of the cause of action in this 
matter on June 19, 2007, only six weeks after their bankruptcy estate closed." R. Vol. I, p. 149. 
The Mowreys' own admissions, that they were fully aware of the facts giving rise to the claim in 
this case even before they filed the bankruptcy petition, are determinative as to whether they were 
playing fast and loose with the court. See Heinze, 145 Idaho at 235, 178 P.3d at 600. Here, the 
district court correctly recognized the undisputed facts, identified the appropriate legal authority, 
and acted within its discretion when it applied judicial estoppel. 
5. The Mowreys Failed To Amend Their Bankruptcy Schedules Despite Being 
Counseled on a Potential Claim in 2006 and Filing the Lawsuit in 2007. 
"The duty to disclose all assets and potential assets continues after the initial filing since a 
debtor is required to amend his or her financial statements if circumstances change." A&J Constr. 
Co., Inc., 141 Idaho at 686, 116 P .3d at 16 (citations omitted). Even if, for the sake of argument, 
the Mowreys did not know of the facts supporting their claims at the time of bankruptcy, they 
were later specifically counseled that they had claims and yet did not amend their bankruptcy 
schedules. 
By the Mowreys' own affidavits, they were specifically made aware of their claim against 
Chevron while their bankruptcy estate was open. See R. Vol. I, p. 100, ii 8; R. Vol. I, pp. 96-97, 
ii 7. And there can be no dispute that they knew of their claim in June 2007 when they filed their 
lawsuit. R. Vol. I, pp. 1-13. 
The district court correctly recognized these facts in its order: 
• "In June of2006, nearly one year after Mr. Mowrey was injured by the Defendant's 
alleged negligence, the Plaintiffs had another opportunity to disclose their claims 
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when their bankruptcy estate was reopened, and they could have filed an amended 
Schedule B." R. Vol. I, p. 149. 
• "Nearly another year passed before their bankruptcy estate was finally closed on 
May 4, 2007." R. Vol. I, p. 149. 
• "Indeed, the Plaintiffs failed to disclose their claims against the Defendants at any 
time before their bankruptcy estate closed on May 4, 2007." R. Vol. I, p. 148. 
• "Plaintiff had nearly two years from the time of Mowrey's accident to make the 
necessary disclosures on their bankruptcy schedule." R. Vol. I, p. 149. 
Despite all of these facts, which were undisputed below and are unchallenged on appeal, 
the Mowreys remained silent and received the benefit of the automatic stay and a discharge of their 
debt. 
The district court acted well within its discretion by applying judicial estoppel to the facts 
of this case, which include the Mowreys' sworn statement in bankruptcy, their subsequent 
discharge in bankruptcy based on the sworn statement, and the fact that the Mowreys knew of the 
basis for their claim against Chevron before filing suit and while the bankruptcy was ongoing. 
On appeal, the Mowreys have not presented any basis to show that the district court abused its 
discretion by applying judicial estoppel. For this reason, the district court's summary judgment 
decision should be affirmed. 
C. THE MOWREYS ARGUE ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS THAT ARE NOT REQUIRED FOR 
JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL TO APPLY. 
Faced with: (1) the above-referenced undisputed facts; (2) an abuse of discretion standard 
ofreview; and (3) the district court's reasoned analysis on both summary judgment and on 
reconsideration, the Mowreys request this Court adopt a new and different formulation of judicial 
estoppel that is inconsistent with this Court's precedent. 
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The Mowreys make four specific arguments. First, they argue that judicial estoppel 
requires an element of intentional concealment. However, this Court has never required a showing 
of intentional concealment for the doctrine to apply. Second, they argue that judicial estoppel 
requires that there be nexus or privity between the prior statement and the current position. Fatal 
to the Mowreys' argument is that this Court has unequivocally rejected privity as a requirement 
in A&J Construction Co., Inc. Third, they argue that judicial estoppel does not apply because 
Chevron was not prejudiced. This Court, however, has expressly rejected a showing of prejudice 
by the moving party. Finally, the Mowreys argue that they "cured" their bankruptcy schedules 
and thus judicial estoppel does not apply. However, the cases they rely on for this argument, 
including the five intermediate appellate court cases from Georgia, are readily distinguishable and 
are not consistent with the formulation of judicial estoppel by this Court. 
1. Judicial Estoppel Does Not Require a Finding of Intentional Concealment. 
The Mowreys argue that the district court abused its discretion because it did not require 
Chevron to prove intentional concealment, which they argue is a prerequisite to judicial estoppel. 
See App. Br. at 13. The Mowreys then argue that the district court misapplied the summary 
judgment standard by failing to credit the Mowreys' affidavit testimony that they did not 
intentionally conceal their claims. App. Br. at 14. The Mowreys cite Eighth Circuit and Third 
Circuit decisions to support their argument that judicial estoppel requires a finding of intentional 
concealment. See App. Br. at 16 (citing Stallings v. Bussmann Corp., 44 7 F .3d 1041, 1049 
(8th Cir. 2006) and Ryan Operations G.P. v. Santiam-Midwest Lumber Co., 81 F.3d 355, 363 (3rd 
Cir. 1996)). Yet, those decisions are not relevant or persuasive because in Idaho, judicial estoppel 
does not require a finding of intentional concealment. Instead, the determinative factor in deciding 
whether a plaintiff is playing fast and loose with the court is what is known or should have been 
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known at the time the original position was adopted. McKay, 130 Idaho at 155, 937 P.2d at 1229; 
Heinze, 145 Idaho at 236, 178 P.3d at 601. 
Given this standard, as articulated by this Court in numerous cases, the district court did 
not abuse its discretion in applying judicial estoppel even though the Mowreys submitted 
affidavits stating that they did not intentionally conceal the claims from the bankruptcy court. 
Instead, as the district court recognized, the relevant fact under McKay, Heinze, and A&J 
Construction Co., Inc. is that the Mowreys knew of the facts giving rise to their claim against 
Chevron yet they failed to disclose it in bankruptcy and never sought to amend their schedules 
even after they had filed a lawsuit. R. Vol. I, p. 14 7 (quoting A&J Constr. Co., Inc., 141 Idaho at 
686, 116P.3dat 16). 
2. Judicial Estoppel Applies Without a Finding That the Inconsistent Statements 
Arose Out of the Same Transaction. 
The Mowreys also argue that judicial estoppel was improper because the inconsistent 
statement to the bankruptcy court did not directly relate to the Mowreys' claim against Chevron. 
App. Br. at 17, 19 (asserting that there "is no nexus between the Mowreys' need to file bankruptcy 
and their claim against Chevron and Northwest."). In fact, the Court has expressly stated that a 
direct relationship between the inconsistent statements is not a prerequisite to application of the 
doctrine of judicial estoppel. A&J Construction Co., Inc., 141 Idaho at 686, 116 P .3d at 16 
(noting that "[w]hile privity and/or detrimental reliance are often present in judicial estoppel cases, 
they are not required") (quoting Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282, 1286 (11th Cir. 
2002) (internal quotations and brackets omitted)). 
Ignoring the statement from A&J Construction Co., Inc., the Mowreys cite Loomis v. 
Church, 76 Idaho 87, 277 P.2d 561 (1954), because there was a nexus between the inconsistent 
positions presented in that case. Chevron certainly does not dispute that judicial estoppel should 
apply in such a case. However, as noted, the Court has expressly rejected a privity requirement in 
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A&J Construction Co., Inc. Whether there was a direct nexus between the inconsistent statements 
in Loomis has no bearing on whether privity or nexus is a mandatory element of judicial estoppel. 
The Mowreys also rely on Indian Springs LLC v. Indian Springs Land Inv., LLC, 147 
Idaho 737, 215 P.3d 457 (2009). That case likewise does not support a finding that the district 
court abused its discretion by failing to require a nexus between the Mowreys' statements in the 
bankruptcy court and this lawsuit. There, the Court concluded that judicial estoppel did not apply 
because there was no evidence that the plaintiffs ever obtained "a judgment, advantage, or 
consideration" from a position taken in bankruptcy. Thus, the elements of judicial estoppel were 
not satisfied. Id at 749, 215 P.3d at 469 (citing Loomis, 76 Idaho at 93-94, 277 P.2d at 565). 
Unlike the facts in Indian Springs, in this case it is undisputed that the Mowreys received the 
advantage or benefit from the sworn representations made to the bankruptcy court-they received 
the benefit of the automatic stay and they had their debt discharged based on disclosures that were 
inconsistent with the position they have taken in this case. 
In no case has this Court said that the doctrine applies only where the parties are the same 
and where the claims arise out of the same transaction. In fact, it specifically rejected such a 
requirement in A&J Construction Co., Inc. Failing to interject a privity or nexus requirement into 
the judicial estoppel analysis cannot have been an abuse of discretion where this Court has 
expressly stated that such a requirement does not exist. 
3. Whether Chevron Has Been Prejudiced is Irrelevant to This Appeal. 
The Mowreys cite New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742 (2001) for the proposition 
that Chevron needs to demonstrate prejudice for judicial estoppel to apply. App. Br. at 20-21. 
New Hampshire does not stand for that proposition and the Idaho Supreme Court has specifically 
held that Chevron need not demonstrate prejudice. A&J Constr. Co., Inc., 141 Idaho at 686, 116 
P.3d at 16 (recognizing that "parties asserting judicial estoppel are not required to demonstrate 
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individual prejudice" because "judicial estoppel protects the integrity of the judicial system, not 
litigants"). 
In New Hampshire, the United States Supreme Court stated that in determining the 
applicability of judicial estoppels, one element courts may consider is "whether the party seeking 
to assert an inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment 
on the opposing party if not estopped." 532 U.S. at 751 (emphasis added). The Court reasoned 
that, "[i]n enumerating these factors, this Court does not establish inflexible prerequisites or an 
exhaustive formula for determining the applicability of judicial estoppel." Id. Thus, contrary to 
the position urged by the Mowreys, prejudice is not required as the district court had flexibility to 
consider the doctrine in light of the facts presented. Further, the unfair advantage or unfair 
detriment factor is framed in the disjunctive. And here, as previously described, the Mowreys 
received the advantage of the automatic stay and the advantage of a discharge of their debt. 
Thus, even if it were required for the district court to have made factual findings on each of the 
New Hampshire factors, the undisputed facts presented support the district court's findings that the 
Mowreys received an unfair advantage based on their inaccurate disclosure. 
4. The Mowreys Did Not Cure the Inadequate Disclosures by Filing Amended 
Bankruptcy Schedules. 
The Mowreys argue that the district court abused its discretion by applying judicial 
estoppel because they moved to reopen their bankruptcy to disclose their claim against Chevron 
after Chevron moved for summary judgment. The Mowreys' belated attempt to amend their 
bankruptcy schedules when faced with a dispositive motion does not overcome the doctrine of 
judicial estoppel. The Mowreys erroneously assert that "[a]ny alleged inconsistent position that 
the Mowreys took was nullified when they amended their petition and schedules." See App. Br. at 
26. For their argument, they rely on a line of Georgia intermediate appellate court cases for the 
proposition that they can "cure" their bankruptcy petition now, even though it has been five years 
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since they made their initial representations to the bankruptcy court and more than three years 
since they received the benefit from those representations. See App. Br. at 22-26 (citing CSX 
Transp. Inc. v. Howell, 675 S.E.2d 306, 309-10 (Ga. Ct. Ap. 2009); McBride v. Brown, 538 S.E.2d 
863 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000); Johnson v. Trust Co. Bank, 478 S.E.2d 629, 631 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996); 
Jowers v. Arthur, 537 S.E.2d 200, 201-02 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000); Rowan v. George H Green Oil, 
Inc., 572 S.E.2d 338 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002)). 
These Georgia cases apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel differently than this Court and 
therefore cannot compel the conclusion that the district court abused its discretion by applying 
judicial estoppel here. In A&J Construction Co., Inc., this Court adopted the Eleventh Circuit's 
analysis in Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2002). See A&J Constr. Co., 
Inc., 141 Idaho at 686, 116 P.3d at 12. As the Eleventh Circuit explained in that case, the "success 
of our bankruptcy laws requires a debtor's full and honest disclosure. Allowing [a plaintiff] to 
back-up, re-open the bankruptcy case, and amend his bankruptcy filings, only after his omission 
has been challenged by an adversary, suggests that a debtor should consider disclosing potential 
assets only ifhe is caught concealing them." Burnes, 291 F.3d at 1288. In CSXTransp. Inc., the 
Georgia Court of Appeals quoted this language from Burnes and then concluded that Georgia state 
courts simply applied judicial estoppel differently than do other courts. 675 S.E.2d 306, 308-09. 
The Mowreys next cite Eubanks v. CBSK Fin. Group, Inc., 385 F.3d 894 (6th Cir. 2004). 
That case is factually distinguishable and thus unpersuasive. In Eubanks, the court concluded that 
judicial estoppel did not apply because the plaintiff-debtors and their counsel specifically made 
the bankruptcy trustee and the bankruptcy court aware of their potential civil claims "through 
correspondence, motions, and status conference requests" all before the bankruptcy action closed. 
Id. at 899. In contrast, in this case, it is undisputed that the Mowreys did not disclose their 
potential claims initially, when the bankruptcy action was reopened, or at any time before Chevron 
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spent the time and money to challenge the Mowreys' claim through a motion for summary 
judgment. Eubanks thus supports the application of judicial estoppel in this case. 
The Mowreys also rely on Finney v. the Free Enterprise System, Inc., 2001WL1157696 
(W.D. Kent. March 29, 2011) for the proposition that the belated amendment cured any issues. 
That case is also distinguishable. There, the district court in Kentucky applied a standard for the 
application of judicial estoppel that specifically included an element of bad faith. Id at * 1. 
As discussed in detail above, however, the elements of judicial estoppel as stated by this Court 
do not require a finding of bad faith or intentional concealment. Instead, "the knowledge that the 
party possesses, or should have possessed, at the time the statement is made is determinative as to 
whether that person is 'playing fast and loose' with the court." Heinze, 145 Idaho at 235-36, 178 
P.3d at 600-01 (emphasis added) (quoting McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148, 155, 937 P.2d 1222, 
1229 (1997)). 
There is nothing in the record to suggest that the Mowreys would have ever disclosed their 
claim against Chevron to the bankruptcy court had Chevron not expended the time and money 
bringing this issue to the attention of the district court. The district court correctly applied the 
controlling Idaho precedent and appropriately concluded that the Mowreys should be judicially 
estopped. It can hardly have been an abuse of discretion for the district court to have followed this 
Court's guidance in A&J Construction Co., Inc. instead of relying on a line of Georgia cases that 
formulate the doctrine of judicial estoppel differently than it is applied in Idaho. 
D. THIS COURT HAS PREVIOUSLY CONSIDERED AND REJECTED THE MOWREYS' ADVICE OF 
COUNSEL ARGUMENT. 
The Mowreys imply, much like they did in the district court, that their failure to disclose 
their claim in bankruptcy resulted from inadequate representation by an attorney who apparently 
advised them that their schedules were properly prepared. App. Br. at 14 ("Both Robby and 
Kim believed that their petition and schedules in the bankruptcy action had been reviewed and 
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approved by attorney Thomas Hale and contained references to all of their assets."). Even if the 
Mowreys had been represented by counsel, which they were not, this argument does not overcome 
the application of judicial estoppel. 
This Court has previously rejected the advice of counsel argument in A&J Construction 
Co., Inc. In that case, the plaintiff argued in the alternative that it relied upon its attorney's advice 
when it omitted its claim from bankruptcy filings and thus the claim should not be barred by 
judicial estoppel. See A&J Constr. Co., Inc., 141 Idaho at 687, 116 P.3d at 17. This Court 
rejected the alternative argument and held that following the advice of counsel "is not equivalent 
to inadvertence or mistake and appears to have been a strategic decision made in preparation for 
bankruptcy court." Id 
Here, it is undisputed that the Mowreys proceeded in bankruptcy prose. R. Vol. 1, p. 34. 
Even pro se bankruptcy debtors are held responsible for their omissions in form bankruptcy 
documents. See, e.g., Trotter v. Bank of New York Mellon, 152 Idaho 842, 275 P.3d 857, 862 
(2012) ("Prose litigants are held to the same standards and rules as those represented by an 
attorney."); In re Glass, 60 F.3d 565, 570 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that a party should "not be 
allowed to shield his conduct by appealing to the court for leniency as a pro se debtor"); In re 
Nagel, 245 B.R. 657, 664 (D. Ariz. 1999) ("laymen who choose to represent themselves are held 
to the same standards as attorneys"). 
In sum, regardless of whether the Mowreys were represented by counsel, they personally 
declared, under penalty of perjury, that they had both read their schedules "and that they are true 
and correct to the best of our knowledge, information, and belief." R. Vol. I, p. 49. Thus, as the 
district court specifically noted, "the alleged inadequate representation of the Plaintiffs' attorney 
does not change this court's determination regarding judicial estoppel." R. Vol. I, p. 150. 
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E. THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION IS CONSISTENT WITH PUBLIC POLICY. 
The district court's decision is consistent with the public policy of protecting the integrity 
of the legal process. Public policy supports the application of judicial estoppel when, as happened 
here, a debtor fails to disclose a claim in bankruptcy. See A&J Constr. Co., Inc., 141 Idaho at 685, 
116 P .3d at 15 ("'There are very important policies underlying the judicial estoppel doctrine. 
One purpose of the doctrine is to protect the integrity of the judicial system, by protecting the 
orderly administration of justice and having regard for the dignity of judicial proceedings. The 
doctrine is also intended to prevent parties from playing fast and loose with the courts."') (quoting 
Robertson Supply, Inc. v. Nicholls, 131Idaho99, 101, 952 P.2d 914, 916 (Ct. App. 1998)); see 
also Hamilton, 270 F.3d at 785 (recognizing public policy behind judicial estoppel); Ah Quin v. 
County of Kauai Dept. ofTransp., 433 B.R. 320 (D. Hawaii 2010) ("The rationale for decisions 
invoking judicial estoppel to prevent a party who failed to disclose a claim in bankruptcy 
proceedings from asserting that claim after emerging from bankruptcy is that the integrity of the 
bankruptcy system depends on full and honest disclosure by debtors of all of their assets . ... The 
interests of both the creditors, who plan their actions in the bankruptcy proceeding on the basis of 
information supplied in the disclosure statements, and the bankruptcy court, which must decide 
whether to approve the plan of reorganization on the same basis, are impaired when the 
disclosure provided by the debtor is incomplete.") (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). The 
Mowreys have presented no factual or legal basis to conclude that the district court abused its 
discretion, particularly given the important public policy served by application of judicial estoppel 
in protecting the integrity of the courts. 
F. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE MOWREYS ARE NOT THE 
REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST. 
The district court correctly held that, as an alternative basis for summary judgment, the 
Mowreys are not the real parties in interest to pursue this matter. R. Vol. I, pp. 150-51; R. Vol. IL, 
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pp. 232-33. As this Court recognized, "[w]hen a debtor fails to disclose an asset or claim, the 
trustee is the real party in interest with exclusive standing to pursue it." R. Vol. I, p. 150 (citing 
A &J Constr. Co., Inc., 141 Idaho at 688, 116 P .3d at 18 n.1 (emphasis added)). The Mowreys 
do not dispute that this is the controlling law or that the trustee has never entered an appearance. 
Instead, they seek reversal based on an order entered by the bankruptcy court authorizing the 
Mowreys' counsel to represent the trustee as special litigation counsel. R. Vol. I, p. 157. 
1. The Mowreys Did Not Adequately Raise Real Party in Interest on Appeal. 
In a mere paragraph, the Mowreys argue that the district court erred by entering summary 
judgment on the alternative basis ofreal party in interest. App. Br. at 27. This Court will not 
consider any argument on appeal not supported by authority. Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790, 
229 P.3d 1146, 1152 (2010). By failing to cite any case authority and making the conclusory 
statement that the district court erred by entering summary judgment on this alternative basis, 
the Mowreys have failed to properly preserve this issue. Thus, even if the Court concludes that 
the district court erred by applying judicial estoppel, the Court should nevertheless affirm on the 
district court's alternative basis for summary judgment. 
2. The District Court Correctly Dismissed the Action Based on Lack of 
Real Party in Interest. 
Even if the Mowreys had properly raised the issue, the district court's ruling that the 
Mowreys lack standing to proceed in this action should be affirmed. The trustee has never 
appeared in this action or requested to participate as a party. He also has not filed a document 
abandoning the claim to the Mowreys. Instead, as referenced, the bankruptcy court's order relied 
on by the Mowreys merely authorizes counsel to continue to represent both the debtors and the 
trustee. Thus, as the district court recognized, the Mowreys lack standing to pursue their claim 
and summary judgment is appropriate. 
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The Mowreys also argue that dismissal on this ground was in error because "a reasonable 
time" has not been allowed for the trustee to join this action. See App. Br. at 27. What constitutes 
a reasonable time for joining or substituting the real party in interest depends upon the facts of 
the case. See Conda Partnership, Inc. v. MD. Constr. Co., Inc., 115 Idaho 902, 771 P.2d 920 
(Ct. App. 1989). This district court was well-positioned to decide that dismissal was appropriate 
because a reasonable time had passed without any attempt to participate by the trustee. This 
decision was correct and should be affirmed. 
G. CHEVRON IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEYS' FEES ON APPEAL. 
The entire substance of the Mowreys' appeal depends upon their contention that the 
district court abused its discretion in granting Chevron's Motion for Summary Judgment. They 
present no meaningful or significant legal challenge and this Court has previously addressed 
and dismissed most of their arguments previously in A&J Construction Co., Inc. Under these 
circumstances, attorneys' fees on appeal are appropriate because the appellate issues raised by the 
Mowreys are frivolous. See Idaho Code§ 12-121; Doe v. Roe, 133 Idaho 805, 992 P.2d 1205 
(1999); Knowlton v. Mudd, 116 Idaho 262, 775 P.2d 154 (Ct. App. 1989). 
V. CONCLUSION 
The district court should be affirmed. The Mowreys have not presented any legitimate 
argument that the district court abused its discretion. The Mowreys do not dispute knowing of 
the facts underlying this lawsuit since June 2005. Given their knowledge of the facts, the 
inconsistent positions taken before the bankruptcy and district courts, and the benefits received 
through their inconsistent conduct, judicial estoppel was properly applied in this case. 
The district court also properly held that the Mowreys lack standing to pursue their claim. 
Under controlling Idaho law, the trustee in bankruptcy is the party with exclusive standing to 
pursue the Mowreys' claims in bankruptcy. A significant amount of time has passed 
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since Chevron first disclosed their claim to the bankruptcy court, and still the trustee did not 
request leave to appear. For that reason, the district court's alternative holding dismissing the 
case on the basis of real party in interest should be affirmed. 
DATED: August 24, 2012. 
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